Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 10

1-2022

Review of July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914
Avan Fata
London School of Economics and Political Science

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Fata, Avan (2022) "Review of July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914," Armstrong
Undergraduate Journal of History: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
DOI: 10.20429/aujh.2022.120110
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh/vol12/iss1/10

This book review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia
Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

Fata: Review of July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914

Review of July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914
By T. G. Otte. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014. ISBN: 9781107064904

One of the most well-known questions in the history of the First World War concerns
the events taking place between June 28 and August 4, 1914, the so-called “July Crisis,”
which began with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and ended with
the British declaration of war on Germany. More than a century after the war, there remains
contention within the historiographical landscape. 1 Far from lying dormant after the Fischer
controversies of the 1960’s and 70’s, the debate over the origins of the First World War
remains a pertinent field in the historical academia, albeit no longer charged with the same
political implications which haunted the “war-guilt” theses of Fischer and his contemporaries.
The centenary of the war’s outbreak saw a flood of publications focusing solely on the
question of why and how the war started, from Christopher Clark’s Sleepwalkers, with its
renewed emphasis on the Balkan origins of the conflict, to Margaret MacMillan’s The War
That Ended Peace, with its long exposition of the political developments in the long run-up to
1914; students seeking to learn more about the July Crisis are certainly spoilt when it comes
to recent works. 2 Among those works which stand out is T. G. Otte’s July Crisis: The
World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914, which on its own could stand as the book to read
on the titular event. This review will analyze both the scholarly arguments and overall

A good overview of the new areas of consensus and contention can be found in Annika Mombauer,
"Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I,” Central European History
48, no. 4 (2015): 541-564.
1

Both these works were admittedly published before the centennial proper (Sleepwalkers in 2012, The
War That Ended Peace in 2013), but they nonetheless are indicative of the renewed interest in the First World
War by the historical community in the recent decade
2

Published by Digital Commons@Georgia Southern, 2022

167

Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 10

narrative in the author’s writing, as well as evaluating where the work stands in relation to the
larger historiography on the beginning of World War I.
Before even detailing the assassination which sparked the diplomatic crisis in Europe,
Otte makes his overarching narrative clear: his research revolves around the role of
individuals – specifically the diplomats and statesmen of the age—and how they came to
make the ultimately fatal decisions of July 1914 which contributed both to the escalating
crisis itself and to the catastrophe that followed. This focus on “the role of the individual
decision-makers” (8) represents a larger shift within the historiography. The “impersonal
forces” which were once proposed to have caused the war (e.g. the alliance systems,
militarism, nationalism) have been rightly relegated to a secondary place in Otte’s approach.
Some may be wary of this new focus, since it appears to portray the story of the July Crisis as
one of great men – dismissive of the structural forces and considerations which existed at the
time. Yet Otte manages to balance both the personal and the impersonal in his analyses: he
recognizes that the larger forces cannot explain the outbreak of war on their own, but is also
cognizant of the fact that their influence on the mentalities of the decision-makers is helpful
in understanding how the Great Powers acted in the way they did during the crisis. In
defending an individual-centric approach, Otte states that “their [the decision-makers’]
concerns about the present and fears for the future thus hold one of the keys to a deeper
understanding of the events of the summer of 1914” (7). Seeing as other historians have
emulated his approach, it would be prudent to deem this analytical synthesis of larger forces
and individual agency the current norm. 3

See, e.g. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds., The Origins of World War I (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914
(London: Penguin Books, 2012); Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to War (London: Icon Books, 2013).
3
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From here, the book launches into the narrative proper, opening with the events of 28
July in Sarajevo and proceeding in a chronological manner, with chapters delineated by dates
which Otte finds critical in the crisis’ development. In each section, sub-headings help situate
the reader in the larger diplomatic situation in Europe, later serving to identify where the
narrative shifts from one of the Great Powers to another. This structure is certainly helpful for
the overall comprehension of the work, and imparts a sense of complexity to the crisis which
previous works may have avoided. By breaking up the periods of the crisis into various stages
and then sub-dividing those dates to focus on a certain government, country, or even
individual’s actions, Otte makes the reader aware of the dynamism which was present
throughout the summer of 1914. Far from being “dominoes falling,” the decisions and
deliberations of the bodies of statesmen took place often simultaneously or at least with an
almost omnipresent sense of urgency – with one notable exception.
Following the assassination and the Austro-Hungarian decision to confront Serbia,
Otte gives particular focus to analyzing the “calculated risk” taken by Germany’s leaders in
granting the “blank cheque” to their Habsburg allies (72-101). Far from echoing the Fischerera assumption of German war-mongering and collective decision-making, Otte points out
that the decision-making behind the blank cheque – as well as the overall responsibility for
Germany’s diplomatic actions – lay with Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow, aided by
Under-State Secretary Arthur von Zimmerman and Political Director Wilhelm von Stumm
(97). In reviewing the erratic and oftentimes fragmented policy-making processes which
these German figures went through during the crisis, Otte concludes that “there was no
proper strategic guidance in German foreign policy in July 1914” (101). Yet he does not go
so far as to place all the blame with Berlin’s decision-makers, boldly stating that although
Germany was “a giant with a brain made of clay” (101), so too was its Habsburg ally.
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With great clarity and insight, Otte then tackles the unusual lull in the crisis from July
6-21, a period which he believes widened the scope of the crisis and escalated it from a
regional matter into a continental one. With the “blank cheque,” Germany had “surrendered
her ability to restrain Austria-Hungary” (103), and Vienna’s delay in forcing a confrontation
with Belgrade served to widen the circle of the crisis and alerted the other Great Powers that
the “Balkan powder keg” was on the verge of being lit once more. Here, Otte focuses on the
initial reactions of the governments of the Entente Powers (Russia, France, and Great
Britain), analyzing how their respective domestic situations and previous crises management
policies established the “interpretative framework” (122) for the decisions of 1914. In
London, St. Petersburg, and Paris, he is quick to identify the key personalities whose
centrality to the decision-making was critical: Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, Foreign
Minister Sergei Sazonov, and President Poincare. Though Otte also illustrates the various
degrees of plurality within the decision-making bodies, ministerial councils, and government
cabinets. Further, his command of the primary source work is magisterial: synthesising
statements and contemporary observations from ambassadors, statesmen, and diplomats as
the crisis unfolded and politicians sought options for their next course of action.
Whilst Otte’s passages on the French and Russian decisions are commendable for
their detail and analytic sharpness, it is with the British government that his expertise truly
shines through. 4 Here, Otte draws on the communiques and correspondence of the British
ambassadors and ministers to challenge the post-war consensus that Grey was a man of
inaction in the July Crisis, pointing out that “there was nothing half-hearted or meandering

Otte’s other works lend himself to this natural aptitude for British foreign policy, and in particular the
Foreign Office under Grey; see e.g. T. G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy,
1865-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); T. G. Otte, “’Almost a law of nature’? Sir Edward
Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 2
(2003): 77-118. More recently, Otte has also written an entire biography of the Foreign Secretary, with a
significant section dedicated to his actions during the July Crisis; T. G. Otte, Statesman of Europe: A Life of Sir
Edward Grey (London: Allen Lane, 2020).
4
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about his policy” (520). Instead, he argues, British involvement in the First World War was
predicated on the assumption that strict neutrality would diminish her position as a Great
Power, regardless of whether the Central Powers or Franco-Russian Entente triumphed (521).
As is often the case when writing about the July Crisis, historians are tempted to
point fingers and name those who appear – at least in their investigations – culpable for
contributing the most to the final continental conflagration. Otte is aware of this temptation,
and his conclusion certainly appears to endorse such proclamations of war-guilt: “the three
eastern monarchies were all giants with double heads of clay” (513). Yet, as with the rest of
the work, balance is achieved by analysing each of the Great Powers’ responsibility for the
war’s outbreak in turn, avoiding any definitive statements shouldering the blame for the
tragedy on any one person or government (516-521).
Perhaps inevitably for a work of remarkable concision, there are rabbit-holes that Otte
chooses to leave half-explored – though certainly none that he dismisses outright. One such
example is the still-contentious question of explaining Count Tisza’s abrupt “u-turn” (155) on
an aggressive policy vis-à-vis Serbia, and the narrative consistently makes references to pre1914 crises without expanding on them to the degree that Clark did in his book; a shame
given how Otte admits from the beginning that “what historians ought to ask themselves is,
what made the summer of 1914 so different?” (7) Nevertheless, July Crisis is a
comprehensive and masterful narrative of the decision-making processes and persons of
1914, simultaneously offering sharp takeaways and an engaging yet all too true tale of
statesmanship. The men of 1914 may have watched in horror as their world came to pass with
the death and destruction of the Great War, but Otte clearly demonstrates how we in the
twenty-first century have yet to come to terms with the war’s origins. It may very well be the
case that the bicentennial will see another “new” wave of historiography with new debates
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and even more theses, but for the current state of things Otte’s book is a must-read for those
interested—in any capacity—with the First World War.

Avan Fata
London School of Economics and Political Science
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